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**IAC-D-78/2**

**\_\_\_\_ April 1954**

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

**PROPOSED REVISED NSCID-11**

1. Attached as Tab A is a copy of a memorandum on this subject from the Director of Central Intelligence to the IAC members.

2. Attached as Tab B is the draft Revised NSCID-11 referred to in paragraph 3 of the DCI's memorandum.

3. Please submit your concurrence or comments on the attached draft of NSCID-11 to the undersigned by \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_

**Secretary**

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the IAC

SUBJECT: Proposed Revision of NSCID-11

1. The IAC agencies have concurred in a proposed revision of NSCID-11 which would amalgamate NSCIDs 11 and 12.

(IAC-D-78/1, 6 January 1954). This proposal was developed because the Executive Order of 15 December 1953 eliminated the classification "Restricted," which is the classification of NSCID-12.

2. On thinking the matter over at greater length, I am impressed with these additional considerations:

a. The Director of Central Intelligence has an explicit Statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Moreover, and quite apart from the injunctions in the National Security Act, each intelligence organization has such a responsibility implicit in its function. Finally, it is in keeping with the Act, with NSCID-1, and with the practices to which we have all become accustomed that intelligence activities in which we have common responsibilities should be coordinated to the extent necessary to protect the national security.

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b. The paragraph in the existing NSCID-11 pertinent to these considerations is paragraph 2. Accordingly, I think this statement should be retained and improved.

c. NSCID-11, paragraph 4, states that references to CIA should emphasize its duties as the coordinator of intelligence rather than its secret intelligence activities, and that no reference should be made to the Agency whatsoever unless unavoidable. I believe this to be unduly restrictive and indeed impracticable. In the same vein, NSCID-12 states that, as a matter of policy, "any publicity, factual or fictional, concerning intelligence is potentially detrimental". This too is so extreme as to be unworkable.

3. In view of the above, I invite your consideration of a draft revision of NSCID-11 attached hereto, as a substitute for the draft circulated in January.

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

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TAB B to

LAC-D-78/2

April 1954

NSCID NO. 11

**Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods from  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
(Revised / /54: Confidential)**

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and since unauthorized disclosure of information concerning intelligence activities is potentially detrimental to the effectiveness of U. S. intelligence organizations and to the national security, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. Information on intelligence sources and methods shall be disclosed only to those whose official duties require such knowledge.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall insure the implementation of the foregoing policy by developing, in coordination with the Intelligence Advisory Committee and with the Executive departments and establishments, as necessary, such procedures as may be required, except where such procedures are separately established by the National Security Council.
3. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 12\* is herewith rescinded.

\*Note: NSCID 12, "Avoidance of Publicity Concerning the Intelligence Activities of the U. S. Government," was issued 6 January 1950.

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